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writers as a follower of the Massa-
chusetts exception, but the case of
Gehrke v. State, 13 Tex., 568, upon
which they rely, does not support
their position, nor do the later de-
cisions in the Texas courts regard it
an authority. In that case an effort
was made to prove insanity not by
the knowledge of the witness of the
fact of insanity, but by comparison
of some other insane person that
the witness sqid he knew, and who
was known to be insane. It is true
that the Court said that it would be
equally improper to receive the
vague expression that the prisoner
looked or acted like an insane per-
son; but this seems to be on the
ground that experts were present
who might have been examined
had they been called. Ini Thomas
v. State, 4o Tex., 6o, the Court, in
holding the opinions of non-pro-
fessional witnesses as to insanity
admissible, expressly said: "The
views here expressed are not in
conflict with the case of Gehrke v.
State. That case is not in point:"
McClackey v. State, 4r Tex., 125;
McClackey v. State, 5 Tex. App.,
320; Webb v. State, Id., 596; Camp-
bell v. State, io Tex. App., 560.
Maine and Massachusetts alone
now maintain the exception to what
has become the universal rule.
HENRY N. SmALTZ.
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Equity-Fraud-Conflential Relation-Ofcer of Corporation and
Stockholder.
Plaintiff, a stockholder in a corporation, applied to defendant, the
secretary of the company, for information as to the condition of the com-
pany and the value of its stock. Defendant stated what tile earnings of
the company had been, but did not state that a lease of a portion of the
company's property had been made, containing an option to lessee to
lease additional property. Defendant then made plaintiff an offer for his
stock, which plaintiff accepted. Soon after, the option under the lease
having been exercised, the stock rose greatly in value, and plaintiff hav-
ing demanded a retransfer of his stock and been refused, filed a bill. The
master found, as a fact, that at the time defendant bought plaintiffs stock
he did not know of anything that was pending, or of any movement in
contemplation, likely to cause a rise in the value of the stock.
31 W. N. C., 244; 151 Pa., 223.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Held, that under these circumstances a reconveyance of the stock
would not be decreed.
Whether the relation between an officer of a corporation and a stock-
holder is of a confiddntial or fiduciary character not determined.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
It was not denied that the plaintiff went to the defend-
ant, who was the secretary of the corporation, for the pur-
pose of finding out what the stock was worth. Prior to
that time the highest price paid for the stock in the market
had been $42.50 per share. At that time the directors of
the company had made a lease to another corporation of
certain wharf property of the company, which lease con-
tained an option to the lessee to take all of the company's
property of that character, and at that time the president
and vice-president of the company were urging the lessee
to exercise this option. Plaintiff did not know these facts.
The master found that the defendant's only knowledge of
the negotiation at the time consisted in the knowledge of
the first lease, which was considered rather disadvantageous
than otherwise by the officers of the defendant's company,
and that the existence of that lease was well known to the
stockholders, and defendant had a right to assume that it
was known to the plaintiff also. Defendant offered to buy
plaintiifs stock, and eventually did buy it at $55 per share.
A month later the option of the lessee having been exer-
cised and all the property .leased, the stock rose to $i25 per
share.
The master found that the plaintiff's bill, which specifi-
cally charged fraud and misrepresentation, was overcome by
the answer, which was responsive; the bill not being sus-
tained by the two witnesses required by the equity rule.
He also found independently that no fraud on defendant's
part was shown. As a question of law he held that there
was no relation of confidence between the plaintiff and
defendant under the circumstances of the case.
The last proposition was not referred to in the opinion
of the Supreme Court (unless it be covered by the state-
ment that they are not convinced "that there is any sub-
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stantial error in the findings of fact or conclusions of law"),
but the "controlling facts" were said to be the master's
findings that "at the time defendant bought the plaintiff's
stock lie did not know of anything that was pending, or of
any movement in contemplation likely to cause a rise in
the value of the stock, and of course lie had no knowledge
to impart to the plaintiff which he unfairly or improperly
concealed;" that the first lease was not considered spe-
cially advantageous, and that defendant might presume that
plaintiff knew of that.
RELATION OF OFrICER OF CORPORATION TO INDIVIDUAL
STOCKHOLDER.
This case suggests, though it can-
not be said to determine, an inter-
esting question. That question is
the relation which an officer or
director of a corporation bears to
the individual stockholders.
The relation of the directors or
officers to the corporation, that is,
to !he body of stockholders, is suf-
ficiently well understood, and is
usually spoken of as a trust rela-
tion, the common expression being
that the directors or other officers
are trustees for the stockholders.
It has been pointed out that this is
not strictly correct. In Spering's
Appeal, 71 Pa., II, SHARSVOOD, J.,
says : "They are undoubtedly said
in many authorities to be trustees,
but that, I apprehend, is only in a
general sense as we term an agent,
or any bailee entrusted with the
care and management of the prop-
erty of another; it is certain they
are not technical trustees." In
Smith v. Anderson, 15 Ch. D., 247,
p. 275, JAIMEs, L. J., says: "To my
mind the distinction between a di-
rector and trustee is an essential
distinction founded on the very na-
ture of things. A trustee is a man
who is the owner of the property
and deals with it as principal, as
owner and as master, subject only
to an equitable obligation to account
to some persons to whom he stands
in the relation of trustee, and who
are his cestuis que trust. The same
individual may fill the- office of di-
rector and also be a trustee having
property, but that is a rare, excep-
tional and casual circumstance.
The office of a director is that of a
paid servant of the company. A
director never enters into a con-
tract for himself, but he enters into
contracts for his principal, that is,
for the company of whom he is a
director, and for whom he is acting.
He cannot sue on such contracts
nor be sued on them unless he ex-
ceeds his authority. That seems to
me the broad distinction between
trustees and directors."
In many cases the determination
of the exact relation becomes im-
portant, as, for example, in cases
of contracts, leases, dealings be-
tween corporations having stock-
holders or directors in common.
These questions are discussed in
numerous decisions. (See Mora-
wetz, Private Corporations, / S16
el seq.; Beach, Private Corpora-
tions, Chap. XIII; Bigelow on
Fraud, pp. 325 et seq.; The Fiduci-
RELATION OF OFFICER TO
ary Position of Directors, 8o L. T.,
299; The Fiduciary Relation of
Directors to Shareholders, 26 Can.
L. J. 66.)
It would seem that the relation
of an officer or a director to an in-
dividual stockholder is not, broadly
speaking, a fiduciary relation. The
question is one which, strange to
say, appears to have seldom arisen,
for the circumstances of the princi-
pal case would seem to be such as
might be expected to occur quite
commonly. The first impression
of the Courts and of the Bar would
seem to have been to the contrary
effect, apparently owing to the fact
that the custom of speaking of the
officers and directors as trustees for
the stockholders naturally influ-
enced the inquirer to regard this
relation as extending to the indi-
vidual stockholder. The question,
however, has been treated in sev-
eral well-considered opinions, and
the result arrived at has been uni-
formly against the existence of a
trust relation.
The earliest reported case ap-
pears to be Carpenter v. Danforth,
52 Barb., 581 (1868). The defend-
ant, who was a director of the cor-
poration, had stated to the plaintiff
that he would give him a better
price for his stock than he could
get elsewhere, and the plaintiff,
without making special investiga-
tion, acceded to the terms which
were offered. The price paid was
the market price of the stock at the
time, but it was well known to the
defendant, and not within the
knowledge of the plaintiff, that the
United States government had en-
tered into a contract with the cor-
poration which would prove ex-
ceedingly profitable. The question"
arose, therefore, whether there was
a trust relation requiring disclosure
on the part of defendant, orwhether
actual, positive fraud was necessary
for a rescission. The Supreme
Court of New York, in a carefully
considered opinion by Mr. Justice
SUTHERLAND, held that there was
certainly a trust relation between
the plaintiff as a stockholder and
the defendant as a trustee or di-
rector; but the trust only extended
to the "management of the general
affairs of the corporation, with a
view to dividends of profits;" and
that plaintiff's stock was not the sub-
ject of trust between them. "My
conclusion is, then," he continues,
"that this case is not a case of con.
structive fraud- that there was not
any such trust or confidential rela-
tion between the plaintiff and Dan-
forth as to make the principle of
equity which has been referred to
reasonably applicable to the case.
In view of the .pleadings and of the
conceded facts of the case, I think
it follows that the sale in question,
if set aside, must be set aside on the
ground of actual, positive fraud."
The case of Commissioners of
Tippecanoe County v. Reynolds,
44 Ind., 509; 13 AMERICAN LAw
REGISTER AND R EVzw, N. S.,
376 (1873), is a leading case. The
allegations which the Court seems
to treat as established were that
the county, plaintiff, owned 570
shares of stock of a railroad com-
pany of which defendant was presi-
dent and principal manager; that
this stock was worth $342,ooo; that
the condition of the company had
been concealed by the defendant by
failing to declare dividends and by
representations that the stock was
not worth its face, and by failing
to show the condition of the affairs
of the company; that plaintiff was
ignorant of the value of the stock,
which defendant knew; that he
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represented that the depreciatioir
of the value of the stock had been
caused by losses sustained, when
he knew that the accumulations
were sufficient to pay all debts and
losses and leave the stock iioo per
cent. above par; that defendant,
through an agent, purchased plain-
tiff's stock at go per cent. of its par
value; that defendant was then
negotiating a sale of the road and
subsequently sold it for '2,500,000,
the par value being $250,000.
WORDEN, J., said: "defendant
doubtless knew much more about
the condition of the affairs of the
company and the value of the
stock, both present and prospec-
tive, than the plaintiff. He pur-
chased the stock greatly below its
real value, as subsequent events
established,.but he paid the market
value at the time, so far as it seems
to have had a market value. Had
the defendant not been connected
with the company as one of its
officers, there is nothing in the
case that would fulrnish any reason-
able ground to claim that the pur-
chase was in any manner infected
with fraud. It is not shown by the
evidence that there was any special
trust or confidence reposed in the
defendant by the plaintiff, which
was violated by the former, or of
which he took advantage." He
then cites with approval and fol-
lows Carpenter v. Danforth, stifira.
DownEY, C. J., dissented. Dead-
erick v. Wilson, 8 Baxt., 109 (1874)
was the next decision, and FREE-
MAN, J., after citing Spering's Ap-
peal and Commissioners v. Rey-
nolds, sufira, says: "There. being
no limit to the amount which he
(a director) may own, as a matter
of course he may purchase it, and
if he may do this, he must neces-
sarily do so from an owner, and
that must be a stockholder. . ..
After all, the simple question in-
volved is whether the officers and
directors are free to purchase stock
from a shareholder in the corpora-
tion on the same terms as others.
To this there can be but one answer,
that is, they may, unless prohibited
by legislative restriction.'
After this came Grant v'. Attrill,
ii Fed. Rep., 469 (1882), which was
to the same effect; as was also, it
would seem, so far as it goes, Perry
v. Pearson, 135 Ill., 218 (izgo), Gil-
bert's Case, L. R., i5 Ch. App., 559
(1870) may, perhaps, be said to be
the converse of these cases, since the
ruling there was that a director was
not a trustee of his owz stock for
other stockholders in the sense
that he should be forbidden to rid
himself of it, if by so doing he in-
creased their burdens, and the case
is approved re South London Fish
Market Company, 39 Ch. D., 324,
but the point we are considering
does not appear to have arisen in
England.
Finally, the question arose in
New Jersey, in the case of Crowell
v. Jackson, 53 N.J. L., 656 (189n,
in an action of deceit, the plaintiff
alleging that defendant, who was a
director and treasurer of the com-
pany, knew of an advantageous
sale of the company's property, o"
which defendant did not know, anC
as to which there was nothing t(
put him on inquiry. It is to bt
observed that this was a commoi
law action of tort. The unanimou
opinion of the Court was expresser
by MCGILL, C., as follows: " W-
are of the opinion that, in contem
plation of law, there can be n
rraud without moral delinquency
in other words, that there is no a.
tual fraud which is not also mor
fraud. In purchase or sale, if thei
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be no designed misrepresentation by
words or deeds and no active inten-
tional concealment, and no inten-
tional silence where there is a duty
to speak, an action of deceit will
not lie. A director or the treasurer
of a corporation is not, because of
his office, in duty bound to disclose
to an individual stockholder before
purchasing his stock that which he
may know as to the real condition
of the- corporation affecting the
value of that stock. He is to some
extent trustee for the stockholders
as a body in respect to the property
and business of the corporation,
but does not sustain that relation
to individual stockholders with re-
spect to their several holdings of
stock over which he has no control.
We approve the conclusions reached
by the'Supreme Court of Indiana
in The Commissioners of Tippe-
canoe Co. v. Reynolds, 44 Ind.,
509, which are distinctly in point
with the questions here raised.
It may seem to have been a waste
of time to collect the authorities
merely with the result of showing
an unbroken line of decisions to
the same effect. But, in the first
place, the point is interesting and
important, and, in the second place,
one must experience a feeling' of
surprise, if not of doubt, on a first
reading of these decisions. That
such a feeling is not unnatural ap-
appears by the comments of the
text-writers. Of the Indiana case
in particular, which it must be ad-
mitted was an extreme case, Taylor
in his book on Corporations, 698,
note, says: "The transaction which
in this case was allowed to stand
seems to the writer to have been
eminently unfair, and, indeed, a-
rule-for which this decision is
certainly authority-that directors
in their dealings with shareholders
are entitled to take advantage of
their knowledge of facts not known
to the latter, but which the direc-
tors are acquainted with by reason
of their official position, seems
of questionable propriety." And
Bigelowsays of the same case: "It
was held that in the absence of
actual fraud the sale was valid. It
was considered that such a case did
not disclose a relation of trustee
and cestui que trust. But the de-
cision was not unanimous, and the
subject is worthy of further con-
sideration. The Court was perhaps
correct in holding that the presi-
dent of the company was not, in
strictness, a trustee toward the
vendor; but it is quite another
thing to §ay that no relation of
confidence and trust existed be-
tween the parties. And that i s all
that is necessary to require dis-
closure:" Bigelow on Fraud, 330.
Yet it is hard to escape from the
common-sense view of the Ten-
nessee Judge-if directors can buy
at all (and their right to do so must
be conceded) they can only buy
from those who can sell, who are
necessarily the stockholders. And
it would be difficult, perhaps, to
restrict the right without hamper-
ing it intolerably. It is easy to
imagine a case in which the
director has knowledge of matters
-for example, pending negotia-
tions-which publicity would ruin
and which his undoubted duty to
the corporatiion compels him to
keep secret. It would be a hard-
ship to lay down a hard and fast
rule that a director under such cir-
cumstances cannot acquire any of
the company's stock without put-
ting himself in the position of los-
ing his money if the negotiations
are unsuccessful and the stock de-
preciates, or losing his stock if the
26o
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negotiations succeed and the stock
goes up. This would be holding
him to the strictest measure of a
trustee's accountability. Another
point is forcibly made by SUNDER-
LAND, J., in Carpenter v. Danforth,
52 Barb., 586: "It will not do," he
says, "to make the principle gen-
erally applicable to purchases by
directors of the stock of their cor-
porations. As to stocks which have
a regularly quoted price or market
value, parties generally sell and
buy them with reference to this
price or value, rather than with
reference to their real value,
or any opinion of their real
value, founded on a knowledge
or supposed knowledge of the
condition of the corporations or
of their affairs. As to such stock,
would it do to make the purchase
of it by a director, though it hap-
pened to be the stock of his own
corporation, an exception, and to
say that the parties dealt with ref-
erence to the real condition of the
corporation and the supposed real
value of the stock, founded on a
knowledge or supposed knowledge
of its affairs? Plainly it would not;
and plainly, in such case, the ap-
plication of the principle of equity
would. be unreasonable. But the
duty arising from the mere trust
relation must be the same in all
cases where the same trust relation
exists; for courts of equity, though
they deal with special cases, apply
general principles."
The rule, then, appears to be
that in general the relation is not
fiduciary, but is one in which the
peculiar circumstances are to de-
termine whether the particular par-
ties stand in such a relation to each
other. Equity will relieve in every
case in which "influence has been
acquired and abused, in which con-
fidence has been reposed and be-
IS
trayed" (Bispham, Equity, j 231).
Thus, beside the ordinary instances
of trustee and cesltui que trust,
guardian and ward, attorney and
client, parent and child, husband
and wife, it has been held that the
relations were confidential between
partners, principal and agent, phy-
sician and patient, persons be-
trothed, a spiritual "medium" and
a believer in spiritualism, sisters,
and similar relations: Darlington's
Estate, 147 Pa., 624; Beach, Mod-
ern Equity Jurisprudence, 125,
et seq. Such a rule, perhaps,
affords to the stockholder as much
protection as the courts can safely
afford him, without imposing an
intolerable burden upon the direc-
tor or officer. It was the rule ap-
plied by the Master in the prin-
cipal case, and may be'so applied
as to prevent gross injustice. It is
to be observed of the Indiana case,
which certainly appears a flagrant
instance of unfair dealing, first,
that the case is badly reported and
the facts not fully stated; and, sec-
ond, that the wrong perpetrated
would seem to have been against
the whole body of stockholders,
and the right of the plaintiff to
maintain abill might be questioned;
and of the New Jersey case, that
the action was a common law ac-
tion of deceit, and not, in form at
least, an application to a chancel-
lor for relief.
In reading this case it must be
distinctly borne in mind that it
proceeds on the assumption that
there was no knowledge on the
part of the defendant of the ma-
teriality of the fact that the con-
tract had been made which proved
so advantageous. That being a
matter of fact, it is unimportant to
the case, as a precedent, whether the
fact was correctly decided or not.
J. D. BROWN, JR.
